Several conceptual arguments have recently been developed to enlighten the potential of bottom-up, collaborative approaches to infrastructure realization (CLAIP, cooperation between local actors in infrastructure projects
Introduction 1
During the last 25 years the utility industries in Europe and other industrialized countries have undergone important reforms. While the new ownership patterns, market structures and regulations have generally improved the static efficiency of utilities, results obtained in the domains of service quality and investments are less clear. More specifically, scholars and policymakers are still struggling to identify the mix of policies that is more appropriate to sustain infrastructure investment (Helm and Tindall, 2009 ). The demand for capable, reliable and environmentally-benign infrastructure is expanding due to social, economic, technological and environmental drivers, but neither the traditional forms of public intervention nor the presence of private regulated actors seem to suffice to meet the requirements for new investments (Cowan, 2006; Oecd, 2008) . In other words an infrastructure gap is opening up, and innova-tive approaches to infrastructure planning, finance and deployment seem to be necessary. Several conceptual arguments have been develop to enlighten the potential of bottom-up, community-based approaches as an alternative way to provide infrastructure (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1993; Agranoff; McGuire, 2001 and 2003; Alberts, 2007) . A wider body of empirical evidence is now necessary to improve our understanding of the scope of collaborative institutional arrangements.
This paper will contribute to this emerging stream of research by empirically exploring the increasing role played by cooperation between local actors in the investment projects (CLAIP) in Italian water utilities and local transport providers. In recent decades, investments in local infrastructures (LI) like the modernization of suburban railways, the realization of new underground systems, the refurbishment of obsolete water pipelines or the deployment of new wastewater treatment plants have encountered problems with planning, finance and public acceptance, which has had a negative effect on the supply of efficient, reliable and environmentally-friendly services. This paper aims to identify what typologies of institutional arrangement foster LI investment and how they meet the challenge. CLAIP benefits and costs and CLAIP structure and organization have been analysed in this paper. Particularly a survey has allowed to identify the channels through which CLAIP affects the success of LI renewal, extension and modernization initiatives and the arrangement characteristics that make it more effective (see Section 3.2).
It should be emphasised that recently the topic of bottom-up, community-based solutions in developing countries has been widely analysed (Ostrom et al., 1993) . When considering industrialized countries, some theories and empirical analyses have addressed traditional user cooperatives and newly established non-profit utilities (e.g. Bennett et al., 2003; Birchall, 2002; Greer, 2003; Hansmann, 1996; Thomas, 2001; van Dijk; van Winden, 1997) . However, the results of these analyses focus primarily on individual enterprises, rather than on cooperative agreements between public and private local independent actors. At the same time, the pre-existing analyses tend to investigate the efficiency and performance of cooperative and non-profit enterprises, and therefore offer little evidence on the advantages (or disadvantages) of these institutional solutions in the domain of infrastructure investment. So the topic of cooperation between local stakeholders in infrastructure development is a rather untapped field of analysis with the possible exception of Agranoff (2008) and Agranoff and McGuire (2001; 2003) .
The empirical analysis illustrated in this paper is mainly exploratory (see Section 4) and the main problems addressed are the following. Firstly, is CLAIP recognized in the utility industry as an effective means for supporting infrastructure investment? Secondly, through which channels is CLAIP seen as improving the effectiveness of infrastructure design and construction? Thirdly, which structural and organizational features are considered to enhance the value of bottom-up infrastructure investment solutions? And, lastly, can it be argued that CLAIP plays different roles in different contexts, e.g. is it more effective when the infrastructure is developed by larger public utilities than by small private utilities?
Introduction
This section, which aims at providing the conceptual arguments that motivate our focus on CLAIP, is divided into three parts. The first begins by defining LI, and then goes on to illustrate two crucial attributes of LI, namely open access requirements and usage rivalry, as it is the joint presence of these elements that creates the risk of infrastructure congestion and degradation over time and makes expansion, renewal and modernization investments so necessary. The second part discusses the information and coordination costs that plague a key investment stage, that is, the highlevel design activities (i.e. planning, finance, engineering). The third part of the survey examines the strengths of CLAIP as a potential remedy to transaction costs arisen by high-level design efforts. And the section ends with a discussion of public acceptance, a dimension that is having an increasingly strong influence on LI deployment, and is as well further motivating CLAIP.
Defining LI
When discussing infrastructures the first difficulty is the lack of clear, unequivocal definitions and taxonomies. In this paper, the term "infrastructure sectors" refers to all the economic and social sectors characterized by the presence of diffuse physical assets, in the form of networks and other facilities (Grigg, 2010) : public transport, energy, water and waste water, waste management, and communications. More specifically, we assume that the term LI includes all the facilities that provide a community (i.e. people, households and firms) with utilities for daily activities, such as gas and district heating pipelines, low voltage electricity distribution grids, water pipes and sewers, wastewater treatment plants, public transport equipment and networks (roads, railways, undergrounds, tramways, airports), waste collection and treatment plants, communication networks etc.
All these asset systems play an important role in local development by contributing to the enhancement of citizens" quality of life (Graham, 2000; McFarlane; Rutherford, 2008) and sustaining economic activities (Berliant; Konishi, 2000; Ostrom et al., 1993) . To a certain extent, they are the backbone of the urban area, interconnecting people and firms in and beyond the town; it is also possible to point out the relevance of the sociological, political and historical dimensions of LI, as argued by Mondstadt: "[n]etworked infrastructures […] are both society shaping and shaped by society" (2009, 1928) .
2.2.
Qualifying LI: open access requirements, congestion risk, degradation over time LI are frequently seen as public goods. This is generally not true. They can rather be defined as impure public goods, due to the joint action of open access requirements and usage rivalry. Künneke and Finger (2009) define LI as common pool resources or "commons". In particular, they stress LI non-excludibility. LI have to be open access, because of their social and economic role in the community"s daily life and development. LI op-erations have traditionally been accompanied by universal service obligations. In some cases, excludibility, namely the ability to exclude those users who are not able to pay for received services, is feasible in practice, but seldom desirable. Firstly, LI are intermediary general-purpose goods, i.e. they are essential inputs to an array of services and goods, as well as complementing other infrastructures Ostrom, 1977; Frischmann, 2007) . Secondly, not only they are at the origin of positive externalities for the local territories (Section 2.1), but the exclusion of some users from their provision could also generate damage for the community (Frischmann, 2007) : typical examples include sanitation problems, or increased pollution and traffic. Indeed, the obligation to serve and the presence of networks that would be too expensive to duplicate (i.e. natural monopoly) are the main reasons why, in several countries, utilities have been traditionally provided by public authorities 2 At the same time, LI can be regarded as rival goods. In spite of the fact that they are sharable, they exhibit partial subtractability Ostrom, 1977) . More precisely, they are simultaneous rivals because the consumption of infrastructure services by one user can reduce the potential consumption for others. In other words, LI have a limited capacity to provide users that access the infrastructure at the same time and independently with an acceptable level of service, i.e. users incur a risk of infrastructure congestion. Rivalry in infrastructure usage also arises diacronically. The degradation of LI reliability over time is related to exogenous physical processes (e.g. corrosion), but it is magnified by usage intensity and bad maintenance practices. In other words, inter-generational trade-offs are likely to arise and they get harsher because of open access requirements.
To summarize, LI are rivalrous as they are exposed to the risk of congestion and deterioration; they are open-access, although technically excludible. Consequently, LI are an example of impure public goods (Frischmann, 2007; Massarutto, 2009 ).
The role of high-level design in LI investments
In this paper we emphasize that the planning and engineering stages are particularly critical for the realization of LI investments. Firstly, not only the quality of these activities closely determines the construction quality. An appropriate design of facilities slows down the rate of deterioration, and curbs the maintenance expenses, provided that the pattern of use is "reasonable" (Ostrom et al., 1993) . Secondly, a high-level design of investments does not limit to engineering activities, it also entails decisions of the investment finance. The economic assessment of infrastructure realization and future maintenance of facility and, relatedly, financial budgeting are indeed central elements for the selection of technical and organizational alternatives. In a nutshell, it could be said that planning, engineering and finance constitute critical conditions for LI sustainability.
Open access requirements and rivalry in usage converge to motivate the search for institutional arrangements that support in an appropriate way the high-level design of infrastructure facilities (i.e. planning, finance, engineering). In particular, expansion, renewal and modernization investments are necessary to cope with congestion and quality deterioration over time, i.e. two risks that are augmented by open access requirements. In order to reduce the risk of congestion and over-time deterioration, good practices in operation and maintenance (O&M) are of course required, but the expansion and modernization of plants, networks and other facilities is as well necessary to ensure the community an adequate LI capacity. In addition, several key maintenance activities require investment on the grid, i.e. the renewal of pre-existing infrastructures.
A high level design has to take into account some transaction costs which are structurally related to LI investment projects. Ostrom et al. (1993) provides a taxonomy of three different typologies of transaction costs that are potentially relevant in planning, finance and engineering.
First of all, transaction costs encompass information costs. This is a very important and peculiar topic for the LI sector. LI are time-and place-specific goods à la Von
Hayek. An appropriate design should consider the "local social and physical environmental characteristics", the "various types of production strategies employed in a region" and the "human [social] and physical capital presently underutilized in an area" (Ostrom et al., 1993, 50) . Localization of infrastructure facilities implies a comprehensive analysis of all the site-specific variables of the system, because generalization is not possible. As Ostrom et al. (1993) have pointed out, if LI design neglects time-and place-specific conditions, and relies only on scientific codified knowledge it ends in creating "marvels that languish underutilized" (1993: 52).
Secondly, transaction costs include coordination costs, which stem from efforts targetted to obtain information from the many stakeholders involved (directly or not), to negotiate agreements and side payments, to develop a correct information in the community in order to stimulate public acceptance (see also section 2.6).
Finally, adverse selection and moral hazard determine strategic costs in investment projects. On the one hand, contractual relations with both public managers and private providers are likely to result in a low level of quality-enhancing efforts absent competition, because of the poor contractibility of quality performances (Hart et al., 1997) . On the other hand, since different networks and infrastructures are interconnected, there is a risk of shrinkage (Künneke; Finger, 2009; Ostrom et al., 1993) . Players who are in charge of investment activities are aware that they could not be clearly identified if they under invest in deployment and maintenance activities (and generate congestion and quality degradation problems). In addition, in case of direct involvement of the State or local authorities, strategic costs could increase due to the risk of corruption and rent-seeking practices by bureaucrats Vishny, 1994) .
Bottom-up arrangements in LI projects
Which are the institutional arrangements which better face the transaction costs that stem from LI investments, and namely, from high-level design? Traditionally, the answer to this question has implied the choice among sharply defined alternative patterns in utility ownership and governance.
Generally speaking, the debate between privately and publicly-owned utilities has brought to no clear conclusion about the most effective ownership model of infrastructure utilities (Helm; Tindall, 2009) . Sunk costs, lumpiness, natural monopoly are essential attributes of LI, which may result in under investment and excessive cost cuts LI in privately-owned companies (Hart et al., 1997 , Cowan, 2006 , Sappington, 2005 . Aside from current constraints in public expenses, the State-owned enterprises have to deal with other problems, which can be traced back either to political interference Vishny, 1994) or to management discretion and weakness of bureaucrats" incentives to supervise managers (Dixit, 2002) .
Ostrom has suggested that it is high time to go beyond the dichotomy public vs. private ownership and to look for new institutional arrangements (1990). As Section 2.4 has discussed, the three typologies of transaction costs arise in both the mainstream models. In particular, the information costs implied by local time and place specific LI attributes, imply that "a "bottom-up", normative and citizen-centred theory of entitlements is necessary in conjunction with a goods-centred top-down theory in order to redefine the role of public services" (Clifton et al., 2004, 11) . This is even more important when considering LI high level design. An approach of governance is particularly necessary to foster LI investment projects. All the stakeholders should accept a shared responsibility for an investment project because they recognize that the necessary resources are spread among them (Green, 2009 ). Thus, the investment project should be based on multiorganizational arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations (Agranoff; McGuire, 2001, 296) . More precisely, the bottom-up agreements take the form of a "collaborative "groupware" based on social capital, shared learning and a culture of problem-solving among role-based actors; and power balances and disparities based on knowledge, technical skill, organizing skill, and leadership" (Agranoff; McGuire 2003 McGuire , 1403 . Going beyond the conventional wisdoms based either on hierarchical relationships led by the State or on the not always trust-worthy autonomy of market forces, this approach has also been defined as "policentricity" (Ostrom V., 1972) : all the actors play their role, but the effectiveness of their action needs coordination and collaboration among them. This is the case suggested for "governing the commons" (Ostrom, 1990) : although in this paper LI are only partly considered "commons" (i.e. excludibility is technically feasible, but open access is socially desirable), similarities between these two groups of goods make a polycentric approach interesting also for LI investment projects. Agranoff and McGuire identify collaborations as an alternative institutional arrangement model based on State hollowness: government by bureacracies is only one aspect of a wide network of relationships in order to achive public goals (1998). Focussing on the cases of 237 cities in the USA, they distinguish project-based intergovernmental networks (related to the design of LI) and resource exchange networks (related to the finance dimension of LI investment project). Collaboration among local actors in LI investment project do not necessarily imply to alter ownership patterns (i.e. privatization or nationalization programs). CLAIP limits to open the way to a set of governance and management practices which affect transaction costs. In fact, coordination, strategic and information costs, in such a way, are drastically reduced because all main actors are involved into collaboration and bring information which can help LI realization.
Bottom-up arrangements as a condition for public acceptance
Infrastructure investments are generally regarded as locally-unwanted investments (i.e. they are at the origin of the so-called Nimby situation). The location processes are becoming increasingly controversial due to the complexity of relations between developer, citizenship, and authorities. In general terms, infrastructure siting involves distinctive difficulties (Vajjhala; Fischbeck, 2007) , because of the project scale, techno-engineering requirements, and geographic constraints. More particularly, the utility networks and facilities generate benefits for the whole community, but they are at the origin of concentrated environmental externalities (e.g. visual disamenities, safety risks, polluting emissions, additional traffic or noise). The neighbouring residents are thus likely to oppose the investment project. The attitude of local community is at the origin of a wide range of siting costs, e.g. monetary payments or in-kind transfers that should compensate the environmental damages, side effects of protest, as the slowdown of construction and operation timelines, litigation costs, requirements of design modifications. According to the Coasean paradigm, a market-based siting decision is likely to be efficient. Local community costs also not homogeneous across sites, because the environmental damages vary with sites (e.g. due to differences in factors such as population density, demography, bio-diversity, tourism intensity, and so on). As a consequence, cost-minimizing developers could autonomously decide to locate the new infrastructure in the neighborhood that receives the least environmental damage, other things being equal (Minehart; Neeman, 2002) . At the same time, the attitude of host communities towards the investment project does not only reflect the intensity of environmental costs, it is also related to its voice potential. Capabilities to appraise environmental damages, to foster a political representation of local interests, and to offer an effective opposition vary highly across communities (e.g. Hamilton, 1993) . Since communities that face similar environmental costs could differ in their potential for collective action the intensity of local opposition ceases to be an efficient driver of location decisions. The solution traditionally proposed to tackle the Hamiltonian effects consists in centralized political mechanisms (Feinerman et al., 2004) . Nevertheless political and administrative decisions are also biased by the voice potential of communities, because they are influenced by political lobbying and mobilization capabilities.
In summary, neither market-based siting processes nor top-down political approaches offer a universal remedy to the location problems. By contrast, the involvement of local stakeholders in the early stages of investment decision process could enhance the efficiency of siting decisions. On the one hand, collaborative arrangements are likely to reduce the transaction costs that hamper the market-based location decision, by favouring the negotiation of compensations and design modifications. Even more substantially, collaboration among local actors favours the transfer of knowledge from the utility to the citizens (e.g. a better understanding of the reasons why environmental impact and safety risks are limited), and from the citizens to the utility firm (e.g. a more detailed representation of the reasons why certain sites are unsuitable for the investment). On the other hand, collaborative solutions can prove to be more neutral than centralized siting processes with respect to local interests, due to a greater variety of local actors. Stakeholders that take part into cooperative agreements do not limit to the community leaders that traditionally dominate lobbying actions and political representation. They could include user committees, chambers of commerce and business organizations, environmental and heritage associations.
Conceptual framework and research questions
During this research some case studies that show how cooperation between local actors has produced satisfactory results have been conducted in order to preliminarily assess the explaining strength of CLAIP theories, and to contextualise them in the Italian utility industry. This section shortly reports three examples, and then illustrates the conceptual blocks of our empirical analysis (the main drivers of LI realization potentially affected by CLAIP, the CLAIP typologies, the CLAIP context) and the relations that link such constructs.
In late 2000, a municipality with around 2,300 inhabitants located in a mountainous region of Northern Italy has fostered the deployment of a medium and low pressure gas pipeline. Previously, diesel oil had been the main energy source used in the area, but this was both costly and inconvenient as it involved considerable storage and supply problems. The pipeline development was a considerable investment that was difficult to justify on account of the municipality being both small and quite far from high-pressure main pipelines. The cost of energy supplies, however, was putting considerable pressure on the local economy which consists mainly of small craft businesses specialized in metal manufacturing, a energy-intensive production process. This situation was further complicated by an unstable legislative framework for local public budgets. Despite all this, however, owing to the joint initiatives of local administrators and local multi-utility company (an entirely publicly-held company) the local institutions succeeded in financing the laying of a 20 km long pipeline specifically for the municipality and another 120 km of pipeline for other municipalities. This is expected to slow down depopulation and and to support the traditional local economy. The intervieweed people have pointed out that the substantial absence of negative environmental externalities made it much easier to gain the consent of all the stakeholders.
Another interesting example consists in the re-launch of an old railway between a big northern city, and smaller towns and rural villages, which also took place in late 2000.
One of the principles that local governments were willing to safeguard was the socalled "territorial balance": while it would be clearly uneconomic to provide certain rural locations with modern and efficeint transport services, depopulation and urbanisation towards the bigger city have their own risks. The bigger urban centre would have increased its size but not its life quality, and this would have increased social spending for the entire community. In addition, the involved rural areas provided unique contributions to the whole territory (for example, biomass production, traditional crafts, tourism) , which were worth being preserved. Very few people used the railway also because the trains were old and slow. This situation, however, created considerable traffic jams when buses and private traffic entered the greater towns, especially at peak times. In order to relaunch and to modernize the railway line, a special team was put together with representatives from the various sectors affected and with the aim of preserving territorial balance, By way of example, if the railway were been assessed purely in terms of the number of tickets traditionally sold, the project would have undoubtedly been abandoned as the per-existing demand patterns were really low. Instead a decision was taken to improve the service between rural and urban areas by investing in the refurbishment of rail lines (e.g. along the network of 103 km new tunnels have been deployed) and in the procurement of new trains (2 trains have been bought, and other 8 trains are on the way). In order to encourage people to change transport modes, an agreement with bus providers has been made, and the bus services were shifted to connect local villages to closer railway stations, while connections to the city have been downsized. The total investment amounted to approximately 180 million euros, and the bulk of financial resources has been provided by the State, Region and Provincial Authorities. The project was managed by a consortium specifically created by Provincial Authorities. Today 150,000 people use this service. Trains leave from the small town every 2 hours and there is an urban service every 15 minutes. The results in terms of travel time efficiency are reported to be impressive. This case study has shown quite clearly that considerable benefits can be obtained by involving all the stakeholders, and by taking into account all the established interests, including the related environmental costs and benefits.
Our third case study regards the renewal of a water supply network that is used by more than 50 municipalities, and by a total of around 122,000 inhabitants in a highly industrialised area. It is a well-known fact that one of the major problems in Italian water industry is the considerable water loss in upstream systems, with several operating problems in terms of water pressure and shortage risks. Unfortunately, the municipality-provider franchising contracts do not help in establishing clearcut responsibilities for the network maintenance and renewal. While it seemed apparent that most stakeholders were interested in network refurbishment, the terms of a potential agreement were far from being well understood. Following a proposal made by the local utility top management, an agreement was signed at the Chamber of Commerce by all the parties interested in improving the service (including major companies and business associations). A redefinition of franchising clauses and a discussion fo financial schemes have accompanied the network re-powering.
The potential relevance of CLAIP theories and analyses that have been surveyed by Section 2 (particularly: Agranoff, 2008; Agranoff; McGuire, 1998; 2001; 2003) has been sketched against investment practices currently in place in the Italian utility and transport industries through the exploratory case studies. We are now in the position to identify the main barriers that currently hamper infrastructure realization in Italian utilities. They can be traced back to the following costs and risks: high siting costs and scarcely predictable project timelines; limited economic and economic sustainability of investment, related to tariff regulation, franchising terms, relations with financial backers; design difficulties in matters such as the project scale, location and technology; mobilization of neighbouring residents and harmed establisked interests against the development. At the same time the previous research and our case stud-ies have hinted to certain conditions that are likely to be necessary for the effectiveness of CLAIP arrangements (e.g actors involved, rules of decision-making process).
The conceptual model illustrated by Figure 1 summarizes the vision that we have now developed on CLAIP, its main effects and the moderating role of context, structure and organization. All these drivers are strictly related to some occurrences of transaction costs which characterize the LI (see 2.4). CLAIP, in fact, is expected to improve at least some of them and to favour the project implementation.
Second, the relationship between CLAIP and the drivers of LI realization varies with structural and organizational aspects, namely the involved actors, the responsibility of each player, the role of leadership, the formal or uninformal structure of the collaboration, the decision-making timing and so forth. Obviously, as in Agranoff and McGuire (2003) , different actors have been involved for different cases and different aims, achieving, consequently, different goals, but it is not possible to generalize how CLAIP is structured and organized. CLAIP structure and organization, as shown in the figure 1, influence its effectiveness by gradually and differently affecting one or more drivers. For instance, the involvement of environmental associations can improve both the knowledge of local specific territorial and environmental issues and, consequently, the public acceptance of a LI; at the same time, it can negatively affect efficiency by protracting the time of decisions, with an unclear net impact on effectiveness.
Finally, context variables do play a role. They are likely to be mainly related to the utility structure (e.g. ownership, number of customers, location), though other external factors could be considered by further analyses. It is not so hard to imagine that the impact of collaboration on the public acceptance of a project concerning water management can be harder when the utility is privately-owned; at the same time, a publicly-owned utility could take for granted the knowledge of the local characteristics, contributing to create useless infrastructures or increasing public opposition to the project.
In conclusion, it is possible to identify a positive relationship between CLAIP and the realization of a LI project, through the impact on different CLAIP drivers. However, this relationship can change whenever the structure and the organization of CLAIP change. At the same time, all these impacts can have different results according to the utility characteristics. In principle our analyiss should address the following research questions:
 Does CLAIP enhance the effectiveness of high-level design in infrastructure projects through an increase of time and cost optimization, economic sustainability, knwoledge and public acceptance?
 Which structural and organizational features are required to draw the most from bottom-up institutional arrangements?
 Is CLAIP uniformily effective or does it play different roles in different contexts?
Empirical analysis
Ideally, the exploration of CLAIP conceptual model (Figure 1 ) and the analysis of our research questions should rely upon a sample with two characteristics. First, in order to obtain results that can be generalized, it should closely reflect the universe of Italian utilities and managers (stratification). Second, it should also include a control subsample. In order to be able to observe the effects due to CLAIP, and not to other factors, the sample should also include a number of infrastructure projects that have not been realised through cooperative initiatives, but with other types of institutional arrangements. Moreover, both the characteristics and effects of CLAIP should be represented through objective indicators. Finally, in order to learn about the effectiveness of different governance solutions, the bottom-up cooperative agreements should be classified according to structural and organizational elements (e.g. the identity and role of involved local actors, the decision rules, the collaboration scope).
Unfortunately this at present seems to be a too ambitious goal. Public domain information on collaborative practices among local actors in infrastructure projects is practically non existent, and available sources (e.g. press news, sector publications) are unlikely to provide detailed information on CLAIP actors, objectives and characteristics.
In the empirical analysis, presented in the following section, these relationships have been observed indirectly through the managerial perceptions of the sample, as the dashed arrows show. As a result, we have decided to conduct a novel field analysis, which explores CLAIP from the viewpoint of sector experts. Despite certain limitations of our empirical approach, the most relevant of which are the reliance upon subjective perceptions and the lack of a control sample (see Section 4.1), one relative strength of our methodology should be emphasised. Traditional objective indicators could at their best reveal to what extent CLAIP initiative have an impact on infrastructure realization but do not tell us how. The importance of disentangling the relations through which CLAIP modifies the investment project implies that depth is a necessary dimension of the analysis, requiring information that is typically beyond publicly available data sources.
As put in evidence in the figure 2 , not all the relationships can be identically observed. Among the research questions we essentially focus on the two main groups of relationships: 1. the effective impact of CLAIP on the realization of a LI through the impact on the four drivers previously analyzed; 2. the influence of the structure and organization of the CLAIP on its effectiveness. Characteristics of the management and firm in general are objective indicator, so that their analysis is differently represented in the figure. 
Description of the data: sample and questionnaire
In order to explore the relationship between CLAIP and the drivers of LI realization and the role of CLAIP structure and organization, we have designed a structured questionnaire. While the first part of the questionnaire was targeted to ask information on firm and manager characteristics by the means of categorical indicators, the second part has allowed to collect qualitative data on the different elements of Figure 2 model. First of all we have validated the questionnaire by the means of some direct interviews. This has allowed us to improve the clarity and consistency of survey. Then we have delivered by email the questionnaire to more than 450 managers in early 2010. The potential respondents have been identified by consulting the yearly census of water utilities and public transport utilities associated to Federutility and Asstra, the major sector industry associations, and by direct telephone queries. The two industries have been selected because the are widely recognized to suffer an investment gap, and during personal conversations several experts have documented that a consolidated body of experiences and attempts in the field of collaborations with local actors have been cumulated. We have selected respondents among Presidents of Boards, Chief executive officers, Operations or network managers as people better informed on high level decisions on infrastructure development. Assistance has been provided by email and by phone when required. At the end 84 questionnaires have been returned (i.e. a 19% return rate). Table 1 illustrates the sample composition with respect to some firm characteristics. Large publiclyowned utilities dominate the sample. In addition, transport enterprises and utilities located in Northern Italy have provided the majority of cases. The relevance of final sample should be assessed against the universe of Italian utilities and transport enterprises. In order to get some sense of the significance and limi-tations of our sample we have referred to a recent survey of utilities realized by the Italian Union of Commerce Chambers (Unioncamere, 2008) This report focuses on those utilities that are fully or partly owned by local governments (i.e. municipalities, provinces, or regions), the most relevant component of sector industry associations (i.e. of the addressed utilities). In Italy, there are, respectively, 328 public transport enterprises and 523 water, electricity, and gas utilities that are controlled by local governments. As to the utility size, the survey reports information on sales. In addition in order to compare our sample with the universe we have collected manually information on the sale figures for all the individual respondents and firms. Larger enterprises (i.e. sales equal to or greater than 50 million euros) account for 9% of this universe, while enterprises with sales smaller than 50 million euros and greater than 10 million euros account for another 23% of the whole sector. Our sample is not stratified with respect to this universe. Among the questionnaire respondents, larger utilities are overrepresented: the top enterprises (i.e. sales greater than or equal to 50 million euros) account for 43% of the sample, while the second class size (i.e. sales smaller than 50 million euros and greater than 10 million euros) account for 50% of observations. The geographic location is more aligned to the universe, because water and transport utilities located in Southern Italy account for 17% of the sector. As far as the respondents are concerned, Three strength points of our survey should be emphasised.
First, while we rely on managerial perceptions, that is, on subjective measures, we have controlled the competences and expertise of interviewed people through a sector experience indicator and a question on past experience in collaboration with local actors. Managers with a long experience in the sector (i.e. more than 15 years) make up the majority of our observations (i.e. 56.5% of the sample, Table 2 ). In addition, only 13 out of 85 respondents have reported that they have a null experience of collaborative initiatives with local actors in the realization of investment projects.
Second, some reversed questions have been included in order to be able to strengthen the consistency of collected information. As will be illustrated in Section 4.2 the statements proposed by reversed items have generally obtained a weaker agreement. Similarly the order through which items have been presented was random, in order to reduce the common bias problem.
Third, although the survey sample is rather small, the data obtained provide in-depth information about cooperation in infrastructure projects. In particular, the questionnaire, after having provided the respondent with a definition and some examples of CLAIP initiatives, has proposed a number of statements on the different drivers through which CLAIP is expected to foster the infrastructure realization. The group of questions is expected to underlie the following conceptual constructs, previously introduced in section 3.2.
 Time and Cost Optimization. Each item describes an element through which CLAIP may or may not decrease the costs and times of infrastructure project.
 Economic sustainability. Each item describes an element through which CLAIP may or may not improve the financial and economic sustainability of investment.
 Knowledge. Each item describes an element through which CLAIP allows the developers to obtain a more detailed knowledge of inputs especially relevant for high-level design of facilities (for instance, the demand potentially expressed by citizens for infrastructure use, or project alternatives), or allows the citizens to overcome suspects towards the new facility by getting a greater acquaintance with the infrastructure characteristics.
 Public acceptance. Each item describes an element through which CLAIP may or may not reduce the opposition of neighbouring residents to infrastructure.
Two items have been preliminarily associated to two different constructs because they are potentially related to both of the conceptual constructs. The respondents have been solicited to express their agreement or disagreement. The interviewees could select their answers from a 5-point Likert scale: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (moderately disagree), 3 (neither agree nor disagree), 4 (moderately agree), 5 (strongly agree). The survey also asks questions about the local actors that should or should not take part into CLAIP initiative (i.e. Structure conceptual construct). At the same time the survey proposes statements that describe the organization of CLAIP initiatives (i.e. Organization conceptual construct): organizations that should lead the col-laboration, potential biases brought in by different actors, reliance upon institutional formalized committees and so on.
The respondents have expressed a general consensus on the benefits that are created by CLAIP as an institutional arrangement 3 . An exam of reported mean values show that Knowledge and Public acceptance are the conceptual dimensions that have attracted a greater agreements. Aside from a reduction of costs and timelines or a more effective relationship with financial markets and intermediaries, cooperation with local actors seems to create conditions for a more effective high-level design of facilities and for a siting process that increases the public acceptance. The sector experts seem to highly value CLAIP especially because it simplifies authorization processes and permitting activities, it elicits a response from local stakeholders that vehicles relevant information on design alternatives, project sustainability and potential infrastructure usage, and, finally, it curbs the residents" oppositions to the development by easing the transfer of relevant pieces of knowledge about the technological and environmental characteristics of plant and networks.
As to the actors who should be involved in bottom-up initiatives, according to the empirical analysis, CLAIP strongly requires the participation of local governments and other local stakeholders, while the convergence of experts on environmental and user associations is slightly weaker. Among the items that describe CLAIP organization, the single most shared statement concerns the relevance of informal coordination structures, while the consensus on other questions is not so strong as it is for the other dimensions.
Results from synthetic indicators
As was mentioned earlier, the questionnaire comprises a large number of specific questions relating to the relationship between CLAIP and project efficiency, financial sustainability of investment, creation and transfer of knowledge on infrastructure characteristics, public acceptance of the infrastructure. Another group of items represent CLAIP structure and organization. We will rely on such information to build a series of (quantitative) synthetic indicators through principal component analyses of the groups of individual answers concerning each of the above mentioned aspects. While it is not possible to eliminate all subjectivity from these measures, the principal component technique extracts information from various questions in the questionnaire simultaneously, somewhat alleviating this problem through the diversity of questions. Such a richness of descriptive elements was necessary to cope with the variety of the impacts of CLAIP on investment realization and the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of infrastructure projects. We decided to extract principal components from the original questions to provide a more parsimonious description of the phenomena at hand. Answers from the questionnaires were codified through binary variables. In order to obtain meaningful indicators, we have subdivided the whole set of questions into the groups shown in section 4.1, and ran a principal component analysis for each group.
The results of the principal component analyses on, respectively, CLAIP costs and benefits and CLAIP structure and organizations are summarized, respectively, in Tables 3 and 4. The internal consistency of each group has been tested by the means of Cronbach"s alpha statistics. The items that decreased the group Cronbach"s alpha have been excluded from the Principal component analysis (see the legend of Tables  3 and 4 ). The reported principal components have been extracted only from the final sets of items, and final Cronbach"s alpha has been reported for each construct. The final factors have been obtained after a rotation of factor loadings. The first column groups the individual questions while other columns reports the factor loadings for the resulting principal components.
First, those respondents who perceive a positive impact of CLAIP on the project efficiency identify main benefits in the simplification of authorization processes and the reduction of project time length (Table 3 , second column, E1-EINC factor). Other experts are more sceptical on the opportunity to launch collaborative agreements with local actors, due to the virtual absence of efficiency increases (Table 3 , third column, E2-ENULL factor). Second, most experts agree that the most relevant implications of CLAIP as to the project finance lie with a more favourable tariff regulation or more favourable franchising conditions, because the relations with financial supporters and markets remain highly complex despite a closer participation of local actors into the project ( Table 3 : CLAIP benefits and costs: Principal component analysis (continuing). Key: (^) The questionnaire included one more item that was related to Efficiency dimension (see Table 3 ). It has been excluded from the Principal component analysis, after a preliminary assessment of the internal consistency of each set of items (i.e. it decreases Cronbach"s alpha). The reported principal components have been extracted only from the final sets of items. Table 3 . Key: (^) The questionnaire included one more item that was related to Efficiency dimension (see Table 3 ). It has been excluded from the Principal component analysis, after a preliminary assessment of the internal consistency of each set of items (i.e. it decreases Cronbach"s alpha). The reported principal components have been extracted only from the final sets of items. Table 4 : CLAIP structure and organization: Principal component analysis. Key: (^) The questionnaire included, respectively, two and three more items that were related to Structure and Organization dimensions (see Table 3 ). They have been excluded from the Principal component analysis, after a preliminary assessment of the internal consistency of each set of items (i.e. they decrease Cronbach"s alpha). The reported principal components have been extracted only from the final sets of items.
Third, the traditional separation between developers and citizens is held to be a crucial target of CLAIP. Particularly, consensus seems to emerge that a polycentric arrangement speeds the acquisition of more balanced information on the facility by the citizenship, and symmetrically it favours a better comprehension of user needs and problems by the other project players (Table 3 , second part, second column, K1-KTR factor). At the same time, the relationship with local stakeholders results in a more complete evidence on project alternatives, a piece of knowledge that is valuable for the facility design (Table 3 second part, third column, K2-KCREAT factor). Fourth, some managers do not think that CLAIP does not favour agreements with environmental oppositions (Table 3 second part, fifth column, PA2-PANULL). In spite of this, experts seem to agree that the vision of citizens about new infrastructure project evolves when they are involved in collaborations with other local actors, and that CLAIP foster negotiations with local opponents to the project (Table 3 , second part, fourth column, PA1-PAINC factor).
Fifth, as far as the structure of bottom-up initiatives is concerned, a group of experts emphasise the opportunity to involve local environmental organizations (Table 4 , third column, S2-UEA factor), while according to other respondents the presence of local governments and user representatives, and the extension of ownership rights to local stakeholders should qualify CLAIP (Table 4 , second columns, S1-LGS factor). Finally, as to the organization of cooperative agreements around infrastructure investments, there are experts that would assign the lead of CLAIP initiatives to local governments (Table 4 , third column, O2-LGO factors), while other respondents suggest that the traditional committees are still effective (so called "Conferenza di servizi", Service conference) (Table 4 , fourth column, O1, TRADO).
Summary on empirical results
The hypothesis that CLAIP acts on LI realization by reducing the relevance of four barriers has been substantially confirmed by our empirical findings (costs and time of infrastructure projects; complex access to financial resources; poor knowledge of infrastructure characteristics; opposition by residents to the facility siting). More precisely, the importance of Knowledge and Public Acceptance as drivers of infrastructure projects is particularly great: CLAIP, thus, is considered by managers an opportunity to learn about site-specific elements, to identify relevant planning alternatives, to inform people about usage opportunities and reduced risks related to LI siting, to negotiate an appropriate system of compensations. Most respondents identify in the project speed up the greatest efficiency impact of CLAIP (e.g. reduced permitting times), while impact on financial sustainability is relatively more uncertain. It should also be said, looking at CLAIP structure and organization, that collaborative arrangements generally seems to be centred around local governments and that the involvement of a wide array of local stakeholders is expected to be fruitful (e.g. business associations), but skepticism towards environmental and user associations is somehow still present.
Conclusions and policy implications
Infrastructures are essential for the supply of local utilities. Several policymakers and experts converge to recognize that an investment gap is emerging in the utility sector. Absent the extension, modernization, and renewal investments, the supply of high-quality, realiable and environmentally benign services is less likely, with direct and indirect negative effects on the economic and social development of communities. Solutions to this problem have been mainly sought for in the debate on public vs. private ownership models. This paper, conversely, refers to a growing body of studies that underline the importance of a specific governance and managerial practice, namely cooperatiev arrangements between local stakeholders in infrastructure projects. In order to analyse how and to what extent CLAIP is perceived to affects the realization of LI, a survey has been conducted over a sample of 84 managers that operate in the local transport and water and wastewater sectors.
Answers to individual questions included in the survey have been analysed in their own, and have been elaborated through a principal component analysis in order to identify which are the main drivers of the realization of LI and to what extent they are influenced by CLAIP. Secondly, certain questions focus on what kind of structure and organisation would make CLAIP more effective. Our results confirm the importance of CLAIP in increasing knowledge of the local time and place specific characteristics of the environment where the LI will be constructed. Thirdly, public acceptance is stronger in CLAIP.
This analysis provides only a preliminary exploration of CLAIP as a means to close up the infrastructure gap, but, to the best of our knowledge, it is one of the really few empirical efforts conducted on this topic in Europe and internationally. The main limitations of this empirical endeavour include the reliance on perceptual indicators and the lack of a control sample, two elements that imply a high relevance of subjective reflections rather than a measure of objective relationships. The main advantage of our approach is the collection of detailed information on institutional arrangeemnts and local actors, something that is typically beyond publicly available data sources. In particular, the depth and richness of survey items has given us the opportunity to disentangle the channels through which CLAIP modifies the investment project. Some features of the analysis are expected to strengthen the robustness of empirical findings (i.e. the sample has deliberately included both top level management and operation managers, in order to guarantee a more comprehensive perspective; adhoc items have been included to control for the experience of respondents; objective indicators have been constructed to control for the respondent characteristics).
Despite the preliminary character of this analysis, it still offers a number of managerial and policy implications for the sector, and a successful planning, construction and finance model for LI does emerge. Firstly, special attention should be paid to a detailed knowledgeof site-specific characteristics, community needs and expectations, problems and potential contributions of the whole set of stakeholders. This has been often taken for granted by utility management, determining the problem of LI inadequacy with respect to the destination community and territory, and encouraging the Nimby syndrome. Secondly, the participation of local governments and other local stakeholders in collaborative arrangements is essential in the very early stages of infrastructure projects, namely in the high-level design activities. CLAIP permits de-
